



Common Security in a changing global context

Position Paper of the **PES Group**
European Parliament

Presentation

“ During the present legislature, the Parliamentary Group of the PES paid particular attention to the issues on the international agenda. In March 2001, a paper was adopted entitled *New Dimensions of Security* which focused on the principles of conflict prevention. Since then new and dramatic events have reshaped the very core of international relations. Unquestionably the crisis in Iraq brought about an unprecedented division within our Union and amongst Member States. It became apparent that the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) had its limits. Not only did the dignity of the United Nations and the multilateralism suffer a severe blow but also deep transatlantic differences over the need for war in Iraq were exacerbated further by divisive and contemptuous remarks such as Rumsfeld's reference to "*an old Europe*" and "*a new Europe*".

With the unpredictable war against terrorism, the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Israel-Palestine conflict, global development, world trade and the deterioration of the global environment, transatlantic relations have seldom seemed so challenging. However, at the same time, the EU has significantly progressed in its aim to set up a new European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Although recent political events have explicitly shown that the current institutional arrangements do not stand up well under pressure in difficult international situations. The EU needs a coherent CFSP and a more effective and efficient ESDP to complement its increasing economic and political weight, to strengthen its capacity for autonomous decision-making and above all to improve its contribution to peace and security at all levels.

This new paper highlights the way the Socialists in the European Parliament define a security strategy for Europe, as well as taking into account the document presented by Javier Solana to the European Council on how to implement the ESDP. The discussion herein also deals with the current debate on the transatlantic relations following the Bush Administration's political choices. Finally, a number of crucial issues within this context such as NATO, the Wider Europe and the global agenda are addressed.

In the post-Cold War era, and particularly following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the security environment has changed. Threats to our security have become so diverse that the traditional approach on security policy is no longer sufficient for analysing the complexity of the global security agenda of the 21st century.

The present paper results from a creative endeavour by the members of the PES Group who were able to reach a common position now available to the European citizens who recently showed a greater interest in issues pertaining to their own life. ”

Enrique Barón Crespo
President of the Parliamentary Group of the PES

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Introduction

“ The PES Group adheres to the principles of common security (based upon co-operation), sustainable security (concentrating on taking away the causes of insecurity) and democratic security (democracy in all its forms and expressions as the best guarantee for security). We prefer co-operation to confrontation. We call for the development of a broader range of security instruments. We want the international institutions to act as a democratic example ”

(New Dimensions of Security, PES Group, March 2001)

This is the latest in a series of papers on security and on international terrorism presented by the parliamentary Group of the PES. In 2001 the Group adopted the paper *New Dimensions of Security* in which the main principles were outlined and conflict prevention was introduced as our priority which can be seen as a token of our appreciation of the role played by neutral and non aligned countries in the EU.

New Dimensions of Security is based on a broad concept of security. Threats to security and peace are often not of a military nature and to tackle them we need a broad range of instruments. Poverty is one of the biggest sources of instability and marks a huge threat to global security, as is environmental degradation. With globalisation, what happens in the developing world affects our own economic, political and even security.

The fight against poverty constitutes an essential element

of the Group of the PES' approach to European security in the world. Development aid for example is therefore of prime importance when addressing the causes of insecurity. The 2001 document also deals with the issues of humanitarian intervention, the role of the UN and the OSCE and with European security and defence policy. Since 2001 new developments in the world changed part of the international landscape.

An update of the earlier PES Group paper is therefore needed. That is the aim of the present paper on *Common Security in a Changing Global Context*. We have to react to the events that caused the debate over Iraq, the EU security strategy and the further elaboration of ESDP. Finally we have to reassess the role of NATO and evaluate new trends in transatlantic relations. It should be obvious that there is no need to change our earlier basic position or to fundamentally shift our priorities. This document should be read in connection with its predecessor.

Common Security in a Changing Global Context was drafted by an Group working party chaired by **Jannis Sakellariou**. The drafting committee consisted of him, **Max van den Berg**, **Richard Howitt**, **Catherine Lalumière** and **Hannes Swoboda**. **Jan Marinus Wiersma** acted as rapporteur.

1 A Security Strategy for Europe

1.1 There is no direct military threat to the EU, but its security interests and the aim of promoting peace world-wide nevertheless need attention. Since 1989 the EU has cashed in the peace dividend and has rightly concentrated on internal affairs such as monetary union,

have to look at the issue of our own military capabilities, it should be clear that they can not be used for pre-emptive attacks or preventive action outside the UN context. Such a policy would seriously endanger international law.

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institutional reform and enlargement. However, this attitude has its limits. The global context and the nature of threats have changed. After the 11th of September, the terrorist attacks have increased our awareness of the dangers that international terrorism and certain states pose. The need for multinational protection of populations and of critical infrastructure adds a new dimension. It is in the interest of the EU to deal with the threat but it will have to do so in a way that is consistent with its principles and with a broader approach to security. Military means are more often than not a blunt instrument in the fight against terrorism. We need a broader range. While coping with terrorism we should pay more attention to its causes.

1.2 It should be understood that so called "failed states" or "states of concern" do not develop without reason. We should try to tackle the underlying trends that make the world unsafe. The EU should not go in the direction of an over reliance on military power and should act as a rational counterweight to those who do, building on EU' s strengths and past experience. While we

1.3 In every recent threat assessment the dangers of WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) have become a focal point. What can be done to avoid their use? We must insist on the adherence to the international agreements on WMD; nuclear, biological, and chemical. We should be especially concerned about the future of the NPT (Non Proliferation Treaty). It cannot be that the NPT only functions as a framework for countries that have decided not to develop and possess nuclear arsenals. Pressure should be kept on those within the NPT that might be tempted to go nuclear but pressure should also be put on those within and outside the NPT regime that already possess a nuclear capability. Elimination of nuclear stockpiles should remain the ultimate goal, rather than the elimination of regimes that might or might not use them. The way in which the Iraq case was managed will make it more difficult in the future for the international community to act when coercive disarmament in the UN framework would really be needed. It is acceptable that we should concentrate our attention on certain countries and take steps, in a multilateral and regional framework, to

reduce immediate risks. The example of Iran shows that coercive diplomacy can work if the EU operates with a single voice. But that kind of policy will only be credible if we do not ignore the longer-term risk posed by countries, who already possess nuclear weapons and have not signed the NPT, and if we keep insisting that the 'official' nuclear powers take their own commitments under the NPT seriously. And that, in the long run, is general nuclear disarmament. To resume testing or to explore the production of 'smart' nuclear arms is not consistent with the NPT. To develop and consider battlefield use of these weapons would break the NPT regime which in turn undermines international security.

1.4 "Mutual Assured Destruction" is obsolete. The nuclear threat has changed drastically, especially in Europe, since the end of the Cold War. Dissuasion probably will not work in the case of unstable states or terrorist groups. It is very difficult to assess the real danger

actions are called for, particularly, for example, in the former Soviet Union.

1.5 Multilateralism is a means but also an end. International problems need international solutions and reliance upon international law. That is why we need the UN. Chapter VII was included in the Charter to guarantee the security of all individual countries. At present the UN does not always have the capability to use that chapter effectively. It can only legitimise (or not) action by individual states, coalitions or collective security organisations like NATO. It cannot enforce its own decisions or is sometimes not able to come to the necessary decisions for lack of consensus in the Security Council. Take also the problems with UN peacekeeping: the developed countries hardly contribute to this effort anymore. There are many complaints about the lack of democratic functioning of the UN.

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but it is obvious that every precaution must be taken to prevent the use by these categories. Anti missile defence is seen in Washington as a way to defend the US. But one has to ask whether the unilateral abrogation of the ABM treaty might not have the adverse effect of stimulating a nuclear build up in other countries. And it certainly will not protect the US against terrorist attacks.

Not less dangerous is the threat arising from the uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear material, but also biological and chemical weapons, and their possible use by international criminal groups and terrorists. This is an area where internationally co-ordinated threat programmes, intelligence sharing, international intervention in certain regions, and joint police

The UN can and does operate as peacekeeper but it will also have to enhance the ability to be a peacemaker. We will lose the argument with the unilateralist tendencies in the world if we remain unable to 'arm' the UN and make its decision making more effective. Too many resolutions have no consequences. Since the US has adopted a passive attitude towards the UN and is only prepared to use it when it is convenient, the EU should take the lead in restoring the credibility of the UN by sticking to a multilateral approach while making the UN tougher. As long as the UN Security Council remains weak and the UN does not possess a credible military component, global security policies will keep the old characteristics of the state anarchy.

When dealing with international crises we respect the sole authority of the UN under Chapter VII. To increase its effectiveness we should do what we can to change the composition of the Security Council. It must become more representative by giving a stake to countries from Africa, Latin America and Asia, which should co-ordinate their action and to the EU, while at the same time considering abolishing the veto system. In any case the extension of the UN SC with new members should not go hand in hand with extending veto rights. The creation of an adequately

resourced rapid reaction force for peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions is essential to strengthening the role of the UN in this area. Another important step would be the introduction of better sanctions systems, including so called smart ones.

A more general reflection on the Reform of the United Nations has been launched by the PES Group and also by the European Parliament. That should be considered as a further elaboration of this chapter.

“ *We need a better UN framework for humanitarian intervention with military means. First of all, such actions should be based on mandates of the UN. Because of the right to veto, the decision-making system is often paralysed. This is the reason why the PES Group pronounces itself in favour of a fundamental reform of the decision-making system. Whilst awaiting this reform, we wish to reinforce the role of the Secretary General of the UN so as to give him the possibility of resolving blockage situations within the Council of Security. When deciding upon a humanitarian intervention, with the help of military means, it should be made clear beforehand that it is proportional to the conflict in case and that it can, and should, be effective. The instrument should thus be used selectively. We support the extension of mediation and arbitration measures, the activities of the International Tribunal of The Hague and the putting into operation of the International Criminal Court* **”**

(New Dimensions of Security. PES Group, March 2001)

2 ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy)

2.1 Significant practical progress on ESDP has been made with the deployment of EU led troops in FYROM and the EU operation in Congo after the Rapid Reaction Force had been declared operational in 2001. An agreement with Turkey on the interpretation of the Berlin plus arrangement with NATO was reached. A final decision was taken about the production of the A400M transport plane. The GALILEO project was approved. Important progress

2.2 Nevertheless ESDP remains very limited in its scope. The implementation deadline of the Headline Goals for the Rapid Reaction force will not be met in time. Even if the EU would have wanted it, it could not have managed the action in FYROM independently. And it has to be doubted whether the EU could reach consensus about a big military operation at the high end of the military scale. Some wonder whether the EU should

“ The proposals of the Convention deserve our support since they will enable the EU to speak more often with a single voice, which is a prerequisite for a well functioning CFSP ”

has been made in the draft Constitution with regard to the mechanisms for CFSP and ESDP. The proposals of the Convention deserve our support since they will enable the EU to speak more often with a single voice, which is a prerequisite for a well functioning CFSP, but fall short as regards majority voting and parliamentary scrutiny. Most important are the introduction of the EU Foreign Minister, also as Vice-President of the Commission, the redefinition of the Petersberg Tasks, the idea of a solidarity clause, and the possibility of structured co-operation in the defence area. The establishment of a European Defence Agency is an important step forward. It will allow the EU countries to enhance armaments co-operation, to strengthen the industrial and technological base and make the defence market more competitive. It should lead to more efficiency, cost effectiveness, and economies of scale while reducing duplication.

really aim for that kind of capability and not concentrate instead on actions at the low end like in FYROM. We do not share this view because it could lead to an unhealthy division of tasks between the EU and the US.

2.3 The keyword remains capabilities and their interoperability and standardisation. In order to sustain even an effort far below the scale of say Kosovo, the EU member states have to considerably increase the effectiveness of their armed forces. Outside the EU this is seen as the basic weakness of ESDP. Some consider it simply as a question of raising the percentage of GDP, devoted to defence. Others prefer a better use of current expenditure and to get rid of outdated armed forces concepts, which would significantly increase effectiveness and make our forces more up to date. We should certainly support the second option as our priority. Nevertheless, it is necessary to ensure adequate resources in order to give the means

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to European autonomous operations (e.g. communications, transport, intelligence) and to increase the EU capacity for conflict prevention, management of conflicts and post-conflict situations. In the end it comes down to the question of how much 'hard' power the EU needs to complement the considerable 'soft' power it already has and according to which strategic concept. It is clear we do not want to leave all the 'hard' options to the US. We also want to avoid the situation in which only NATO offers EU countries a framework for out of area situations.

2.4 First and foremost we want the EU to have a credible military option additional to the other foreign policy instruments available. The EU is in the unique position to be able to offer a broad range of instruments for crisis management. In this way the EU could become a civilian superpower that operates differently from the US because the element of soft power will be dominant. Its military component would be large enough

for limited operations in or outside Europe in which the EU could also handle the post conflict civilian operations. For larger scale operations the EU could be part of UN sanctioned international coalitions.

2.5 For the PES Group it is fundamental that the EU improves its capacity to anticipate crises. The problem of our countries is not the question of military power but of political competence to take the right decisions at the right moment based on correct information and to select the right instruments. The available post conflict instrument, such as negotiation and mediation as well as support for democratic and economic reforms in crisis-ridden countries should be used for conflict prevention. Preventive engagement as the European Security Strategy document presented by Javier Solana calls it. For that we have to carefully analyse the threats. All military action must be taken in accordance with the UN Charter.

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“ Our priority is strengthening conflict prevention. Preventing conflicts is based on predicting the future by learning from the past and the present. We need more and better capacity to do that. The EU also needs to develop a comprehensive set of instruments, to formulate concrete non-military headline goals and to introduce an adequate and competent decision-making system ”

(New Dimensions of Security, PES Group, March 2001)

3 NATO

3.1 NATO remains the strategic alliance responsible for the collective defence of its members including most of the new EU member states. We need strong cooperation between NATO and the EU. But there is a certain competition with regard to out of area operations. The EU still lacks the overall capability to operate independently but has arranged a deal with NATO for support

3.3 A critical question, for NATO and ESDP alike, is the one about compatibility because the vast transformation of the US armed forces – the automated battlefield – makes it more and more difficult for US and European units to operate together in a war situation. This problem has to be dealt with in the NATO capability planning process. It will only work when both sides refrain from

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in planning, intelligence, logistics and communications. We acknowledge the decision of the Council to increase the staff of the EUMC in order to reinforce its planning cell and to implement a new EU planning cell within SHAPE. Thus, the EU member states will be able to act in own EU operations, in EU operations with NATO means and in NATO operations.

3.2 NATO has decided to set up a Response Force that would be able to operate in a war environment and expects Europeans to provide for the bulk of the 20.000 troops. Some fear that this will complicate the establishment of the EU Rapid Reaction Force or vice versa. Washington has always preferred an European security and defence initiative (ESDI) within NATO above ESDP. Nevertheless problems can be avoided as long as the tasks and areas of potential action for each force are clearly defined from the outset.

over protection of their armaments industries. Eventually, the member states will also have to make some efforts for the gap not to widen any further.

3.4 Finally the US will have to answer those critics who say that it does not take NATO decisions seriously because of the cumbersome decision making procedures. See Afghanistan. In recent times NATO has only been asked to do post conflict military operations. In these circumstances, the US needs to publicly reaffirm its commitment to NATO.

4 Transatlantic relations

“ *The EU and the US have to become equal in terms of political decision-making. This equality has to be developed through a better balance in the divisions of tasks in order to promote a better regional and global burden sharing with the aim of enhancing security overall* **”**

(New Dimensions of Security, PES Group, March 2001)

4.1 In its previous position papers, the PES Group has stated its commitment to the pursuit of an effective and credible European CFSP, which will contribute to the strengthening of its values of the fight against poverty and inequality being major reasons of conflict, multilateralism, and the primacy of international law according to the UN Charter. This has become all the more urgent now that the United States under the Bush administration has embarked on a course based on the unilateral interpretation of American interests.

4.2 When one compares the adopted European Security Strategy with the National Security Strategy of the US, adopted in September 2002, the conceptual differences are obvious. Where the Europeans speak of preventive engagement and effective multilateralism, the US government underlines the possibility of pre-emptive (unilateral) military action and the ambition to remain the only military superpower. While the US mentions the national interest as the guiding principle very often, the EU devotes much more attention to the need to promote justice at the international level in whatever form. And when the EU defines the UN system as essential to international security, the US states that the mission defines the coalition. These contradictions within transatlantic relations are at the core of the security debate.

4.3 Nevertheless it is useless to define Europe in terms of the United States either in a positive or in a negative way. We should on the contrary underline our own values based on a long common history of healthy debate. This therefore reflects a rising debate about values. There is the old Europe of intense and deadly wars and there is the new Europe of the European Union. When we prefer soft power it is because we know the dangers of an over reliance on purely military means. In contrast to unilateralists in the Bush Administration, we believe in universal values and in international institutions to protect them and ourselves. There are enough people in the US who basically agree to this line but are also prepared to act unilaterally in exceptional circumstances like those originating in the terrorist attacks of the 11th of September. Europeans should acknowledge US anxieties and show understanding for their reactions but at the same time not accept terrorism as a pretext for unilateral military actions and violating fundamental human rights. We recognise the need for more transatlantic dialogue at all levels.

4.4 It was the coalition around President Bush that promoted the neo conservative agenda. Like everything its success will not last and it will not therefore dominate the trans-atlantic agenda forever. In the US people are also angry about the way in which the war was advocated and the lack of preparation for peace. But there

remains a trend that goes deeper and also has support within the Democratic Party. That is the conviction that in the 21st century the rules have changed and that the US as the sole super power has an exceptional responsibility that cannot be shared by others. Most Americans know that even the US cannot control the world and that those who dream of (informal) empire have it wrong. They accept a more equal role for Europe as soon as the old continent would be capable of assuming it. This is clear from available surveys. Outright anti-Americanism will push the majority to the margin because it will help those who want to go it alone. Americans should stop presenting Europe for what it is not and we should help by improving our very weak communication efforts. And we should help them remember how we tried to improve the world after 1945 together. Not alone.

4.5 For the moment this will not solve a number of outstanding problems. To tackle the most important:

- Many rejected the invasion of Iraq because there was no specific UN mandate for such action and they were not convinced that the WMD inspections had been exhaustive. The EU governments themselves were divided over the

consensus the peace turns out to be more difficult than the war. This lesson is being driven home in the US itself. This experience should guide the debate a next time. When it arrives we should again not exclude international action against a state or regime that threatens international security harbours terrorists or is involved in genocide but this decision must be left to the United Nations.

- We remain convinced that pre-emptive or preventive war should be rejected. We do accept that in certain circumstances and as a means of last resort a military intervention might be justified but only when it has clearly been established that there is no other option available and within a legitimate international framework and under the authority of the United Nations Security Council.

- We disagree strongly with suggestions of empire building and redeployments of US forces in that context. We oppose the concept of a uni-polar world based on US military supremacy because we are convinced that multilateralism is in the end more effective and more efficient.

- The US Senate in its present composition does not accept the International Criminal Court because in its view American interests are not being protected enough. Compromising with this lack of belief in an international

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issue, although the citizens largely mobilised against the war This has made the EU less of a factor for the US than before leaving only NATO with credibility in the eyes of many Americans, including some of those close to us who now demand a greater engagement of the international community in Iraq. Because of the lack of international

institution controlled by the UN Security Council is out of order. The EU will have to continue its support for the ICC and try to prevent countries from signing an art.98 agreement with the USA. It is our role to maintain its credibility and make sure that the functioning of the Court will prove the US wrong. We will however have to continue our

debate with them and search for a solution. This touches upon the very important UN reform debate. Whoever thinks that the UN can function without US engagement is wrong.

■ In our view, the US is absolutely moving in the wrong direction with regard to the Kyoto Protocol. Again the EU should stick to its position. We really need the agreement not only because of the example that it shows, but also because the mood might change in the US. For that to

of disarmament. Of course it should keep trying to change US policy to become more multilateral.

4.6 We prefer a clash of policies to a clash of antagonisms. Where we can move together, let us try. When the US moves contrary to an established EU position, we should protest but should not have the illusion that we can stop the US course of action. In a number of

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happen the EU could show a preparedness to go back to the negotiating table and offer the Americans what was offered Japan. And the EU should take its own commitments more seriously.

■ Globalisation, trade and the Washington consensus. The present US government is more protectionist than its predecessor at least in some areas like agriculture and steel. In others like intellectual property and market access elsewhere it is aggressively liberal. It still strongly supports the IMF/World Bank consensus even though its own debt policy shocks most of those who work in these institutions. The trade problems between the EU and the US actually show that they have the same policies, and these are in general detrimental to the developing world. The EU has as much power in 'Washington' as the US itself.

■ There is a serious problem with disarmament. Many important initiatives like on small arms or land mines are not being supported by the US for reasons indicated above. The US has developed its own non-proliferation regime, which undermines the NPT. The EU should have a more courageous strategy on this, seeking support from other major players and fielding more 'soft' power in support

situations they just will not need us, as they cannot stop us when our values are on the line. But even this somewhat pragmatic approach will not work if we remain vulnerable to the 'cherry picking' of the US in Europe. This was obvious in the pre-Iraq-war situation: important members of the Bush-administration presented their unconditional followers as "new Europe" and interpreted disagreement as disloyalty or treason. To avoid a repetition of this situation the enlarged EU should work towards more unity in the CFSP area. This is why our decision making procedure must be radically changed.

5 The wider Europe

5.1 The new frontier of the enlarged Union should be regarded as a positive opportunity, aiming at building up a network of deepened relations with its Eastern and Southern neighbours; therefore it should be the task of the European Union to develop with these countries and regions a comprehensive and effective neighbourhood concept, capable of searching for more effective solutions to the problems posed by the interdependence and globalisation.

We must be careful that the Wider Europe strategy progress with the other EU foreign policy objectives, such

based on democracy, rule of law and the dialogue between cultures and religions. Only then will Europe really be secure. This strategy is in no way incompatible with certain European neighbouring countries' aspirations to EU membership or different contractual relations.

The new neighbourhood policy of the EU should therefore be a CFSP priority. Closer links will promote the convergence of the EU with the surrounding region. Free trade, cross border initiatives, co-operation in the fight against crime and illegal immigration, nuclear safety, cultural exchange and political dialogue will provide a basis for a

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as development and fostering human rights on a global scale.

The recent global developments should not lead to an over concentration on issues that originate from 'out of area'.

The EU has an agenda for the near abroad that needs to be further elaborated. It is obvious that the EU's existing foreign policy instruments work best in the wider Europe and its relations with its new neighbours.

One should not underestimate the problems that could possibly develop in some of the countries concerned and the difficulties that these could cause the EU in the future. They are far from stable and we have a long common way to go until we establishing a coherent system of relationships

future discussion concerning EU membership with a number of these countries.

It speaks for itself that the first and foremost role of ESDP is to take responsibility for crisis management and peace keeping / peace making operations in (and around) Europe.

5.2 The strategy launched by the EU regarding its neighbourhood gives us an opportunity to also highlight the security aspects in the framework of the relationship with all concerned countries (Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus; the Mediterranean partners of the Barcelona Process).

5.3 The Mediterranean dimension of security is of major importance considering the existing conflicts in the region and the possible consequences of other sources of conflict for ethnic, religious, social and

economic and political influence. Russian business is very dominant in this region and Moscow is tempted to use the energy weapon in its foreign policy. It also accepts without

“ The Mediterranean dimension of security is of major importance considering the existing conflicts in the region... The present Barcelona Process must be strongly revitalised also in the field of security ”

economic reasons. The present Barcelona Process must be strongly revitalised also in the field of security through a coherent and effective Euro-Mediterranean partnership that, in addition to encompassing the socio-economic dimension, must ensure respect for human rights and democracy.

One must take into consideration the possibility to develop co-operation processes between the OSCE and the countries of the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

5.4 The Russian Federation is in a different league. Relations with the EU are good and political tensions over the enlargements of NATO and the EU have abated. Both parties focus on trade and energy relations. Russia is no longer a conventional military threat and is about to reduce its nuclear arsenal considerably. It behaves as a good and active partner in the fight against international terrorism. It has a special relationship with NATO and has no ambition to become an EU member.

But there are darker sides to Russian politics that often

real action the lack of democracy in a number of CIS states like Belarus. Russia itself is not (yet) a real democratic country and gives a bad example to others, especially concerning its role in Chechnya and the human rights situation. The EU should devote more attention to these aspects in its dialogue with Russia. It should engage countries like Ukraine, so as to make them aware of the relevance of democracy as a pre-condition for closer relations with the EU.

To be able to promote more openness and transparency in the wider Europe the EU could take up the challenge formulated by Moscow, to make the OSCE more effective.

6 The global agenda

Though this paper highlights the debate between the EU and the US, we are aware of the need for the EU to also re-assess its policies with regard to important international players like China and the Russian Federation. New coalitions are being established in the world as became clear during the Cancun WTO summit. This creates additional

the lead in this area. The recently established African Peace Facility is a welcome EU initiative and we must ensure it remains well funded. Also, regional integration in Africa is essential and we should support their effort as much as possible.

“ For the Group of the PES, this not only means the willingness in principle to let the EU deal with security issues around the globe, but also being active world-wide to deal with poverty, the environment and, more generally, the consequences of globalisation ”

independent actors on the international scene. The EU not only has to acknowledge them but also seek their active co-operation because they are relevant for peace building and the fight against international terrorism. Act local, think global.

For the Group of the PES, this not only means the willingness in principle to let the EU deal with security issues around the globe, but also being active world-wide to deal with poverty, the environment and, more generally, the consequences of globalisation. Development co-operation and aid are instruments of prime importance. The EU takes

The EU can and must play a decisive role in ensuring that the millennium goals are met, in bringing about radical reform of WTO rules to achieve fair trade and in developing a more balanced and democratic global governance, to harness global economic and social forces in the interests of all the world's people. The EU should in particular use its leverage in the IMF and the World Bank to reformulate the so-called "Washington consensus" and to create more favourable economic and financial terms for developing countries. Building a just and inclusive world will in time reduce world security threats and provide more global security in the long run.

NEW DIMENSIONS OF SECURITY

The Common Foreign Security Policy of the European Union
(March 2001)

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1 The challenge

The security challenge for social democrats and socialists is twofold. Firstly, we have the broader, global security agenda of the 21st century. Secondly, we must define the new dimensions of European security after the EU summits of Cologne, Helsinki, Feira and Nice, that took important decisions on the issue.

In the post-Cold War era, the main enemies to peace, democracy and development – are the enormous imbalance between the North and South in the world and poverty in many countries of the Third World which also engenders a major refugee-producing factor. No military arsenals, no nuclear arms race will give security in this situation. You cannot shoot at poverty – but poverty can shoot back at you. Here we should apply the socialist and social democratic principle of solidarity more vigorously. Security and solidarity are two sides of the same coin in today's world. A massive programme for poverty eradication must, for this reason, be a priority for our foreign and security policy. Hence, it is not only morally outrageous but also politically mindless when rich countries begin to cut down on international development assistance. Security is, in other words, indivisible and closely linked to economic and social development, both east and west, north and south. Poverty is not the only global security risk. We also have to point at other causes like ethnic and religious conflicts, terrorism associated with nationalism and fundamentalism, organised crime and drug trafficking, lack of democracy

as well as the degradation of the environment and water issues. It is often the combination of these factors that cause actual conflicts. We also should not underestimate the role of political ideas and politicians as potential and major sources of conflicts. The threats to our security have become manifold. They are often less direct and different in scope and nature. In a globalised world, they have become interlinked. While the military threat in Europe has become less important, we might be confronted with new regional instabilities caused by the factors mentioned above. The security environment has become more dynamic. Security can no longer be seen as just a military problem. To promote a secure world, problems in the areas of democracy, the globalisation of the economy, the deterioration of the environment have to be dealt with in that context. On the basis of this insight, new concepts, policies and instruments have to be developed.

We actually have to take on more responsibilities than in the past, when the confrontation between the blocs very much limited our scope for international action. These responsibilities, while they have a military dimension, must not be defined in those terms alone, nor primarily. Concepts, policies and strategies that are non-military have to be developed and to be given at minimum the same priority as is currently given to the military dimension.

2 Our principles, our concept

There are three basic tenets for European security. We think that the principle of **common security** still applies to Europe and elsewhere. This principle recognises that lasting security will not be achieved until it can be shared by all through co-operation on the basis of equality, justice and reciprocity. Secondly, we adhere to the wider concept of comprehensive **sustainable security**. One should not only address immediate situations of insecurity. There should be much more focus on taking away the causes of insecurity. Conflicts are caused and maintained by many factors. They range from social tensions to environmental questions. They often have a human rights' dimension. There may be historic causes. One often sees a mix of short-term and long-term problems. Addressing these should be part of any policy dealing with certain areas of insecurity. A good example of such a comprehensive policy is the EU itself or

its enlargement process. It is obvious that in most cases the military instrument is not sufficient to take away the causes of instability. We will always have to ask ourselves when deciding upon the use of the military whether there are civil alternatives or how this use fits into a broader security approach. Kosovo was, and still is, a good example of the dilemmas involved. A new military crisis (after the ones in Croatia and Bosnia) led to a breakthrough in the EU policy: The adoption of the Stability Pact is an attempt to forestall future military problems with a comprehensive security approach. This is a very positive development. It is regrettable that we did not take account of it earlier.

It is clear that the emphasis on sustainable security also highlights the importance of the instruments of conflict prevention and civilian

crisis management. This includes the analysis, early detection and resolution of conflicts. The EU has a wide range of instruments at its disposal or under development but must arrange and use them better. The military instrument of the CFSP will be a means of last resort.

The CFSP has the advantage of being able to use incentives to promote security, involving trade, aid, bilateral and multilateral agreements, among other things. In order for the CFSP to be effective though, there will have to be more consistency between the operations of the EU pillars in this area.

Special attention should be paid to the security aspects of the Third Pillar for Home and Justice Affairs. They are, of course, part of any wider security concept. But in Europe as a whole, they deserve special attention given the democratic instability in many areas. Crime and corruption blossom in those circumstances. Terrorism remains an important threat.

It is obvious that this wider concept of security is also based on our evaluation of the existing threats. These threats, for the moment, are much less of a military nature than, say, 15 years ago. Military instruments have a limited scope. They cannot help to improve the natural environment. They are useless when it comes to tackling our complicated relations with other states or federations.

The third element is the aspect of **democratic security**. We believe that democracy (in all its forms and expressions) is the best guarantee for security. The rule of law, respect for human rights, a culture of democracy and stability of the democratic institutions are essentially also pillars of security. But if that is the view, we should also apply it to the way we organise our security. The present international system is not sufficiently representative. But also closer to home, one can question the way in which NATO takes important decisions and the models of democratic scrutiny used when taking or implementing those decisions. Some also question the functioning and composition of the UN Security Council. Why not move from the veto-system to majority decision-making? In fact, the UN might need a kind of Intergovernmental Conference to deal with the issues of enlargement of the Security Council and qualified majority voting. All these considerations also underpin our claim that the CFSP pillar should be under close democratic scrutiny by the European Parliament and by the national parliaments.

When we try to translate our basic assumptions into some guidelines we come up with the following:

We want to promote co-operation to avoid confrontation. Wherever possible, we should try to avoid conflicts or solve them through co-operation with all the parties involved. Only when this fails should we consider alternative solutions. When applied to Europe, this guideline means, for example, that the strengthening of CFSP should be linked to an improvement of the functioning of the OSCE and the Council of Europe.

Applying a wider concept of security means that we will have to develop a broader range of security instruments to guarantee security in all its aspects. We will have to evaluate and reassess many of our policies in this light. National security has to be redefined. We want to give priority to the use of civilian instruments for conflict solution with a credible military capacity in the background. We believe that the military instrument is often not the best option. Sometimes it is even impossible to use it. It should only be used when we fail after serious attempts to prevent or solve a conflict with other means. It is also obvious that we prefer conflict prevention to (military) crisis management.

Emphasising sustainable security does not mean that we can do without a military component. That remains fundamental to any security policy. Credible defence capabilities are essential in many ways.

3 EU Security and defence co-operation

The European Union has made enormous progress in this field after the Summits of Helsinki, Cologne, Feira and Nice. The PES Group has participated actively in defining the position of the European Parliament on all the aspects of the new European security and defence policy (ESDP).

The PES Group has supported the evolution of the CFSP since the Treaty of Maastricht. The EU needs a coherent foreign and security policy to give expression to its increasing economic and political weight, to strengthen its capacity for autonomous decision-making and action and, above all, to improve its contribution to peace and security at all levels. The development of the CFSP should be considered in the context of the wider security concept of the PES Group. We supported the inclusion of the Petersberg tasks in the Treaty. We agree that the EU needs to be able to act when military crisis management or humanitarian intervention is called for. We have accepted the concept of peacemaking as an important step in the development of our security approach. We share the conclusion of the European Council that the Western European Union (WEU) as an organisation has fulfilled its purpose. The integration of necessary WEU functions into the EU is therefore logical. We also support the idea of autonomous actions by the EU to enhance collective security in Europe. NATO involvement is not always necessary. But we should be careful to develop accountable and transparent

procedures for co-operation.

The Helsinki Council decisions have been welcomed. They are a dynamic step towards the constitution and creating the EU capacities needed to be able to execute Petersberg tasks. The Rapid Reaction Force will be an important link in a more comprehensive CFSP. It will be an important instrument of crisis prevention, crisis management and humanitarian intervention. It can only be successful as part of a wider set of instruments, as outlined. The concept of the EU was developed with the idea of ensuring that never again would Europe be at war with itself. The Rapid Reaction Force is an instrument in a range of many that can be used to restore or enhance collective security, mainly in Europe.

The European security and defence policy (ESDP) and the notion of the European Security and Defence Identity was analysed in detail in the Lalumière reports that we as a group support. We want to underline two aspects. Ambitions have to be translated in an efficient, flexible and comprehensive set of instruments. Here the EU does not have a strong tradition.

Finally, we are concerned about the growing democratic deficit in the CFSP area. We consider it our responsibility to further develop proposals in this area to eliminate the existing deficit.

4 Strengthening conflict prevention: our priority

There are many lessons to be learned from our history in the Balkans. The most obvious one is also the most disheartening. Why were we not able to prevent the military conflicts and their enormous costs to all sides? We were not prepared. For that reason, military interventions turned out to be unavoidable in the end. We did not know what to prevent and how. The sudden transition from a static to a changing world surprised us. A new awareness of the importance of conflict prevention has grown out of this experience. What existed mainly on UN and OSCE paper and was practised by only a few states has now also become a priority for the EU. The Helsinki Council conclusions make that clear. This is most welcome, since it underlines the overriding importance of civil security instruments. It is an expression of the belief that in many situations the military instrument can and should not be used to prevent or solve (potential) conflicts. The most concrete expression of this new awareness are

the enlargement decisions, the Stability Pact and the Common Strategies for Russia and the Ukraine. But these steps do not completely eliminate the risk of violent conflict.

There are many ways to define conflict prevention. In our view, it consists of either anticipating conflict or solving it with non-military instruments (civilian crisis management). Post-conflict action can also be labelled conflict prevention (to avoid repetition). Conflict prevention has a wide scope. It can be sectoral, like water management. How does one deal with the increasing lack of water resources in the Middle East? It can be geographical, for example the Balkans. It can be of a global scale, take global warming. It can be regional, take OSCE operations. A wider security concept thus leads to a wider definition of conflict prevention. Preventing conflict is based on predicting the future by learning from the past and the present.

We need more and better capacity to do that. Alongside military planning and military scenarios, we have to develop conflict prevention planning and conflict prevention scenarios. We need more special skills. Some call this the change to a culture of conflict prevention.

We have to look at the instruments. The EU has a wide range of possibilities for conflict prevention. They are used in the examples cited. The EU has a great potential in the economic and political areas. But conflict prevention works only when the potential conflict is defined precisely and a comprehensive set of instruments are made available.

This differs from situation to situation.

At present, the EU does not dispose of flexible packages of instruments to be used in certain types of conflict prevention. Formulating conflict prevention needs in terms of situations and instruments is hampered by the overlap between the first and second pillars within the EU. There are no co-ordinating mechanisms yet, so it is difficult to develop concentrated efforts. There is also no common pool of national and EU resources.

The European Council is aware of this and has called for initiatives in this field. The European Commission has also formulated new proposals.

The EU has to urgently develop a global and a regional conflict potential evaluation and identify structural risk factors. On the basis of this evaluation, new areas and new activities can be identified. As already stated, the EU is actually undertaking a lot of conflict prevention activities. But there are neglected areas. Test cases could be envisaged, for example the water issues in the Mediterranean or the stabilisation of Albania.

The EU will have to make an inventory of existing instruments and will possibly have to identify new ones. If we try to list the needs/instruments/activities/threats, we get the following picture, and especially: humanitarian aid; election monitoring; police deployment and training; border controls; institution building; mine clearance; arms control and destruction; illicit trafficking; embargo enforcement decided by the UN with the support of the EU and development of smart sanctions; fight against terrorism, organised crime, HIV/Aids and drug trafficking. The EU has already a lot of experience in a good number of these areas. But we need a scheme of what mix of instruments we need for which situations so that we can organise effective civilian power projection combining experience, old and

new instruments, EU or national. We have to make a distinction between short-term conflict prevention for which the Commission is making preparations (see the list), and for which existing instruments seem best suited, and long-term activities. In particular, the EU needs to select technicians and economists who have received specific training to be used in all relevant sectors ranging from prevention activities to technical operations. A well-trained police force should also be available. Together this could be labelled the "non-military rapid reaction unit", which goes further than the already existing police instruments. Obviously, we also need an efficient funding arrangement for the eventualities mentioned here. We should look into ways of involving the business community and civil society in conflict prevention.

The EU should develop a better structure to be able to assess possible threats to security that might develop into conflicts. This should include a centre for active crisis prevention and a network of specialists that should help develop the culture of conflict prevention aimed at sources of insecurity. In order to strengthen the CFSP in general but also in the context of conflict prevention, the EU should improve its intelligence capacities.

The EU has to set dates and non-military headline goals for all new measures in the conflict prevention area. Finally, an adequate and competent decision-making system has to be installed (including quick action mechanisms). The co-ordination between the first and second pillars has to be improved.

5 Disarmament: old promises and new needs

The end of the Cold War also meant the end of an intense disarmament negotiation process that had led to important agreements on nuclear weapons, levels of conventional armaments and to bans on chemical and biological weapons. At the same time a strong trend has evolved to reduce defence budgets. It seemed that there was no need for a new disarmament agenda and international attention focussed elsewhere.

Eleven years later, we have to come to the conclusion that this neglect carries certain dangers. There are still serious problems with the implementation of some of the treaties. The agreed destruction of a large number of nuclear arms has not been completed yet. There are concerns about the way in which fissionable material is dealt with. Not all chemical weapons have been destroyed. Furthermore, the nuclear powers have still to fulfil their promise to eliminate all nuclear arms. The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty has not been ratified by the US.

But there are also positive signs. In the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 2000 review conference the nuclear weapon states for the first time unequivocally undertook to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament. The conference reaffirmed that the total elimination of these weapons is the only guarantee against the threat of the use of them and it agreed to practical steps for the implementation of the relevant article of the NPT including a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, an agreement banning the production of military fissionable material within 5 years, increased transparency in military nuclear matters, strengthening of the Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, further reduction of the operational status of nuclear weapons systems and a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies. It is clear that the introduction of a National Missile Defence (NMD) system would not be in line with the NPT review. Our goal is and remains the full implementation of the 2000 conclusions.

The situation concerning Pakistan and India, which have not signed the NPT and maintain a tense relationship, needs to be addressed.

Finally, a lot of work has to be done in the areas of landmines and small arms that are becoming more and more of a scourge in under-developed countries. See the phenomenon of the "child soldier".

The European Union can, and should, become more active. Disarmament falls within the scope of the CFSP and its goals. The EU has always tried to co-ordinate disarmament policies in the UN and the OSCE. The EU is involved in the reform of the nuclear industry in CIS countries. But this role should be extended. The EU needs to produce a comprehensive definition of the EU role and it needs to outline concrete activities.

First of all, an answer should be found to the question of whether or not the EU should claim a political role in the nuclear debate for example by forwarding a disarmament initiative including a time plan within the NPT framework as described above. The answer can be "yes" given the existing co-ordination on NPT issues. There is some urgency in that, given the existing divergences between Europe and the United States about missile defence. If China and Russia reply in kind, a new nuclear arms race might be initiated and this obviously would also be a threat to our security.

We furthermore want the EU to follow the example of the US Co-operative Threat Reduction Programme, which aims at helping Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries in destroying agreed stocks of arms and in countering illegal proliferation. The EU has the knowledge and the means to become more active.

Finally, the EU should incorporate in its bilateral relations with certain countries the necessity to address the risks of mines, small arms and the proliferation of missile technology.

6 A framework for humanitarian intervention with military means

The theory and practice of humanitarian intervention with the use of the military are still underdeveloped. The instrument has only been used on occasion, especially in Bosnia and Kosovo. There are examples of other major interventions (UN) but they were based on a peace-agreement that came about without outside military engagement and/or with permission of the local authorities, like Cambodia or Mozambique.

The Kosovo military episode left some questions that remain unanswered. The mandate of the NATO action was contested by the Russian Federation and China. They refused to join the coalition led by NATO, although, ironically enough, Russia was a determining link in ending the conflict as it ended. The question is whether coalitions without a very clear international mandate are to be avoided in the future. The answer must be positive. But this immediately raises another question. What can be done in the case of a humanitarian disaster when an uncontested mandate cannot be achieved? Given the present international rules (especially within the UN Security Council), the necessity of a Kosovo type of intervention cannot be excluded under any circumstances. Therefore, the rules should be discussed if we want to respect the respective competencies of UN and OSCE. Actually the UN Charter is partly outdated. It was formulated during the Forties when a bipolar world already became visible and when the so-called great powers gave themselves veto powers. The national state was then sacrosanct. The UN Charter has to be adapted to the needs of the modern world. The philosophy of the

nation state has to be changed. The ban on violence against states sometimes contradicts with the need to protect human rights. Kofi Annan is right: national sovereignty offers vital protection to small and weak states, but it should not be a shield for crimes against humanity. The lack of stability within a state can become an international threat. The rules for UN intervention have to be improved. The UN security system has to become more democratic. Only under that condition can we determine exactly who decides and can the UN also become in practice the sole arbiter. Until the rules have changed, we propose a stronger role for the UN Secretary General. While supporting increased powers of the UN in relation to the national state, the PES group also calls for a thorough debate on the issue and for a cautious process of adapting international rules. There should be no room for abuse of new rules. We urge the EU to take the lead in this debate.

The second major question concerns when and how to intervene in which situation. Can we develop criteria? Should the international community react identically in each situation where identical criteria apply? In theory, the answer should be "yes". In practice, we know this will not happen. There will always be a political assessment of whether a military intervention will be effective or counterproductive. There will always be the element of proportionality. The outcome of these assessments creates a certain selectivity that is sometimes hard to justify. (See for example: Kosovo versus Chechnya). Again we urge the EU to help elaborating these criteria.

7 The role of UN and OSCE

The present document deals basically with the elaboration of the CFSP and the role of the European Union, namely in Europe. The EU is developing into a more formally organised security organisation with actually a concrete potential for concrete action. The EU is both an organisation and a power. But it is neither NATO nor the United States of America. It is unique and has to develop a new place alongside existing organisations and powers like the US and Russia. This will be one of the challenges of the strengthened CFSP. Here we raise the question about the relation to the UN and the OSCE. Both are competent in the area of security. The EU has to respect these competences and the international obligations that originate from that. The EU should not duplicate their role. Though relatively weak in certain areas, we need the legitimacy of UN or OSCE, because they are organisations with a wider mandate than the EU. The EU should not duplicate their global and regional efforts. The EU must avoid placing itself outside their context. It should, in fact, try to strengthen them as useful instruments for finding global or regional

solutions to conflicts. The EU is already the main supporting pillar of the UN system. It and its member states are the biggest contributors. There is standing EU co-ordination within the UN. A stronger CFSP should be used to add to the UN, not to weaken it. Conflict prevention is a priority both for the UN and the EU. We should seek ways of enhancing the UN in this field and offer our support.

The same applies to the OSCE. It is active in many places, often in very concrete conflict prevention actions like those of the Commissioner for Minorities. It offers legitimacy to crucial peace operations. It remains the best forum for debate about security rules in Europe. It is more important than the Partnership for Peace of NATO. The influence of the EU within the OSCE will increase, through enlargement and as a consequence of the reform of the CFSP. The increase of a positive influence of the OSCE and of the Council of Europe helps long-term conflict prevention.

8. US-EU Security relations

When considering US-EU security relations, we should start with stating the obvious. We have a lot of interests in common based on shared values. In a concept of shared security, both have to be equals, i.e. equals in terms of political decision-making, not in terms of military capacity. We could never develop the kind of nuclear arsenal available to the US. The EU could and should give more importance to conflict prevention, especially in Europe but not excluding the Middle East or Africa. This will include the development of an EU (or an EU plus...) military intervention capability. In a sense it means that Europe will have to look after itself more.

We think this is the way forward. But we have to be aware of new trends in the US where a growing number of politicians opt for maximum national security based on new technology. For Europeans, living in a risky continent, this is hard to follow. The NMD debate is an example. The development of NMD is unacceptable as proposed and we will have to persuade the US that their plans are wrong and will in fact lead to a new arms race which will certainly not enhance their security. We have to be careful not to create an artificial contradiction between the ESDP and the NMD. We should not trade our 'autonomy' against their separate security.

Nuclear deterrence - as long as it exists - will continue to be (co-) guaranteed by the US under NATO at ever lower levels of nuclear armaments. (See our support for the NPT review 2000). That is the reason why we should oppose the development of a National Missile Defence system, which would create two types of security within the Atlantic Alliance. The introduction of a system that would also protect Europe would mean the end of the ABM Treaty. A stronger EU military posture will enable the EU to deal with European security and, when called for, (limited) out of area crises. This will create a new model of burden sharing.

The EU should not obligatorily duplicate all available NATO assets. Only in certain areas will we have to develop new potential, which will be chosen gradually by the Union. Heavy lift and satellite communications are good examples for economic and for political reasons. We have to be aware of the economic risks of a widening technology gap. European armament programmes can help us close this gap, although we should avoid export pressures and establish an openness and accountability which would help to avoid undue influence of the industry on political decision-making.

As we indicated before, we do not believe in a purely European solution to the security problems of Europe. We therefore need a new kind of agreement with the US. If we do take that seriously we will have to define our ambitions as in line with a progressive development of NATO, in liaison with the ESDP. We recommend a pragmatic approach. In the end, it is not only US-EU relations that are at stake, but the general security situation in Europe. When we talk about "burden sharing", we mean Europe. The Americans rather talk about

global responsibilities. We should be open to developing a global partnership, in the context of the UN, and not to limit completely our security role to Europe and its neighbouring regions. But such a partnership cannot be based on the concept of "military policing the world". When we discuss the role of the EU in the world, we should start by applying the concept of common, sustainable and democratic security.

9 Regional security policy: Russia, a new partner

It is one thing to strengthen the instruments of the CFSP. It is another matter to use them effectively in developing our relations with the Russian Federation. Petersberg tasks and Rapid Reaction Force are not the answer to the outstanding security issue in Europe. We are presently covering most of Europe through the enlargement process and the Stability Pact for the Balkans. There we are working towards lasting stability arrangements.

Russia is a greater challenge. What is our conflict prevention strategy? How much 'real politik' will we use in addressing our human rights' concerns? How can we convince Russian society that we want to live in peace as equals and partners and that we share a common interest in strengthening their democracy? How do we define our strategic interest? How can we make sure that the EU and the Russian Federation are on converging paths? Though these questions are the expression of a certain concern, we should keep turning towards Russia and not away from it.

First and foremost Russia is part of Europe. Its cultural richness and potential economic power are important to us if we are serious about creating a lasting peace and prosperity in Europe. Secondly Russia is a very important trading partner. It is also an important

supplier of raw materials and energy. Our policy toward Russia should therefore aim at real partnership and this of course requires considerably more resources to be applied to our current programmes than is now budgeted for. Our approach has to have strong geographical components, i.e. the Northern Dimension, the Southern Dimension and the issue of Kaliningrad. The borders of the EU are moving in the direction of the Russian Federation. We have to acknowledge that current Russian foreign policy is on a middle course, which is neither pro western nor ultra nationalist. It is obvious that Russia wants to participate actively in European security structures and it shares our concerns regarding NMD. A big challenge will be to avoid new dividing lines as a consequence of the NATO and EU enlargements.

It is outside the scope of this paper to address all these questions. We only raise them to highlight the fact that creating certain security instruments is often easier than solving certain major structural security issues. We also need a reorientation of our thinking on certain strategic European issues. The PES Group will develop, as a matter of some urgency, a separate policy paper on EU-Russia relations.

Summary conclusions

1 Any security policy will have to express a new awareness and reassessment of the threats to our security. It can no longer be one-dimensional but will – urgently – have to address the new enemies of peace, democracy and development. First of all, it should aim at reducing poverty. But it should also concentrate on other factors that are often interlinked. To mention some: ethnic conflicts, violation of human rights and environmental degradation. We should not underestimate the role of politicians and their ideas as sources of violent conflicts. We also need to take into account the rich diversity of defence and security cultures and practice, including neutrality and non-alignment within the EU and the enlargement countries. The experience of peace keeping within the UN of these countries has significantly informed and influenced the new emphasis on conflict prevention. The PES group acknowledges and seeks to draw upon this diversity of experience in formulating its policy and in influencing the development of the CFSP.

2 The PES Group adheres to the principles of **common security** (based upon co-operation), **sustainable security** (concentrating on taking away the causes of insecurity) and **democratic security** (democracy in all its forms and expressions as the best guarantee for security). We prefer co-operation to confrontation. We call for the development of a broader range of security instruments. We want the international institutions to act as a democratic example.

3 Our priority is strengthening conflict prevention. Preventing conflicts is based on predicting the future by learning from the past and the present. We need more and better capacity to do that. The EU also needs to develop a comprehensive set of instruments, to formulate concrete non-military headline goals and to introduce an adequate and competent decision-making system.

4 The EU can, and should be, more active in the area of disarmament. We want to combine the old agenda with a new one. The EU should help formulate the steps that will help to implement the goals of the NPT. A full stop should be put to nuclear testing and we demand further reductions of nuclear arsenals (including the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons) in the perspective of total nuclear disarmament, which would mean the end of nuclear deterrence. These steps should be the elements of a balanced process in which all involved really take part. With an agenda like this, it is only logical to clearly reject the NMD. The new agenda should consist of practical steps to eliminate the risks posed by the proliferation of mines, small arms, ballistic missile technology and chemical and biological arms.

5 We need a better UN framework for humanitarian intervention with military means. First of all, such actions should be based on mandates of the UN. Because of the right to veto, the decision-making system is often paralysed. This is the reason why the PES Group pronounces itself in favour of a fundamental reform of the decision-making system. Whilst awaiting this reform, we wish to reinforce the role of the Secretary General of the UN so as to give him the possibility of resolving blockage situations within the Council of Security. When deciding upon a humanitarian intervention, with the help of military means, it should be made clear beforehand that it is proportional to the conflict in case and that it can, and should, be effective. The instrument should thus be used selectively. We support the extension of mediation and arbitration measures, the activities of the International Tribunal of The Hague and the putting into operation of the International Criminal Court.

6 The EU should not duplicate the role of the UN and the OSCE; it will have to become their privileged partner. A stronger CFSP should be an addition to the UN, especially in the field of conflict prevention. Adding positive weight to the OSCE is an investment in long-term conflict prevention. The influence of an enlarged EU with a stronger CFSP will grow considerably.

7 The PES Group supports the evolution of the CFSP, including the defence element. The Rapid Reaction Force can be an important instrument of crisis management and will extend the range of possibilities of the EU. The PES Group is concerned that the new ambitions of the ESDP will be translated into an efficient, flexible and comprehensive set of instruments. We also are concerned about the growing democratic deficit in this area and will come with further proposals to eliminate it. To this end, the European Parliament must demand the total application of its competence as laid out in the Treaties.

8 According to the Barcelona process, stability and peace throughout the Mediterranean are important objectives which need major commitment; the adoption of the "Charter of Peace and Stability" between the partners of the Euro-Mediterranean process will constitute a fundamental step. A political dialogue with our partners of the Middle East and northern Africa on themes concerning security, the control of armaments, migrations and human exchanges, the fight against terrorism, the respect of human rights and the development of democracy is necessary.

9 The EU and the US have to become equal in terms of political decision-making. This equality has to be developed through a better balance in the divisions of tasks in order to promote a better regional and global burden sharing with the aim of enhancing security overall.

10 An enlarged EU will have new outer borders. These must not lead to a new division of Europe, either to the East or to the South-East. The PES Group intends to elaborate new policies for those areas based on the principles and ideas contained in this document.



Parliamentary Group of the Party of European Socialists
Groupe Parlementaire du Parti Socialiste Européen
Fraktion der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Europas
Grupo Parlamentario del Partido Socialista Europeo
Gruppo Parlamentare del Partito del Socialismo Europeo
Fractie van de Partij van de Europese Sociaaldemocraten
Euroopan sosialidemokraattisen puolueen parlamenttiryhmä
De Europeiska Socialdemokraternas Parlamentsgrupp
Grupo Parlamentar do Partido Socialista Europeu
De Europæiske Socialdemokraters Gruppe
Κοινοβουλευτική Ομάδα του Ευρωπαϊκού Σοσιαλιστικού Κόμματος
az Európai Szocialisták Pártjának parlamenti frakciója
Klub Parlamentarny Partii Europejskich Socjalistów
Poslanska skupina Stranke evropskih socialdemokratov
Parlamentný klub Strany európskych socialistov
Euroopa Parlamendi sotsiaaldemokraatide fraktsioon
Poslanecký klub Evropské strany sociálně demokratické
Eiropas Sociāldemokrātiskās partijas Parlamentārā grupa
Europos socialistu partijos parlamentine grupe
Il-Grupp Parlamentari tal-Partiti Soċjalisti Ewropej

EUROPÉAN PARLIAMENT
RUE WIERTZ - B-1047 BRUSSELS
TEL.: +32 2 284 21 11
TEL.: STRASBOURG: +33 3 88 17 40 01
INTERNET: <http://www.socialistgroup.org>

For further information contact: bmarasa@europarl.eu.int